Non-monotonic Reasoning in Deductive Argumentation by Hunter, Anthony
ar
X
iv
:1
80
9.
00
85
8v
1 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 4 
Se
p 2
01
8
Non-monotonic Reasoning
in Deductive Argumentation
Anthony Hunter
Department of Computer Science,
University College London,
London, UK
Abstract. Argumentation is a non-monotonic process. This reflects the
fact that argumentation involves uncertain information, and so new in-
formation can cause a change in the conclusions drawn. However, the
base logic does not need to be non-monotonic. Indeed, most proposals
for structured argumentation use a monotonic base logic (e.g. some form
of modus ponens with a rule-based language, or classical logic). Nonethe-
less, there are issues in capturing defeasible reasoning in argumentation
including choice of base logic and modelling of defeasible knowledge.
And there are insights and tools to be harnessed for research in non-
monontonic logics. We consider some of these issues in this paper.
1 Introduction
Computational argumentation is emerging as an important part of AI research.
This comes from the recognition that if we are to develop robust intelligent
systems, then it is imperative that they can handle incomplete and inconsis-
tent information in a way that somehow emulates the human ability to tackle
such information. And one of the key ways that humans do this is to use ar-
gumentation, either internally, by evaluating arguments and counterarguments,
or externally, by for instance entering into a discussion or debate where argu-
ments are exchanged. Much research on computational argumentation focuses on
one or more of the following layers: the structural layer (How are arguments con-
structed?); the relational layer (What are the relationships between arguments?);
the dialogical layer (How can argumentation be undertaken in dialogues?); the
assessment layer (How can a constellation of interacting arguments be evaluated
and conclusions drawn?); and the rhetorical layer (How can argumentation be
tailored for an audience so that it is convincing?). This has led to the develop-
ment of a number of formalisms for aspects of argumentation (for reviews see
[BH08,RS09,BGG18]), and some promising application areas [ABG+17]).
Argumentation is related to non-monotonic reasoning. The latter is reasoning
that allows for retraction of inferences in the light of new information. Interest
in non-monotonic reasoning started with attempts to handle general rules, or
defaults, of the form “if α holds, then β normally holds”, where α and β are
propositions. It is noteworthy that human practical reasoning relies much more
on exploiting general rules (not to be understood as universal laws) than on a
myriad of individual facts. General rules tend to be less than 100% accurate,
and so have exceptions. Nevertheless it is intuitive and advantageous to resort
to such defaults and therefore allow the inference of useful conclusions, even if
it does entail making some mistakes as not all exceptions to these defaults are
necessarily known. Furthermore, it is often necessary to use general rules when
we do not have sufficient information to allow us to specify or use universal laws.
For a review of non-monotonic reasoning, see [Bre91].
In using defeasible (or default) knowledge, we might make an inference α on
the basis of the information available, and then on the basis of further infor-
mation, we may want to withdraw α. So with defeasible knowledge, the set of
inferences does not increase monotonically with the set of assumptions.
Example 1. Consider the following general statements with the fact the match
is struck. For this, we infer, The match lights. But, if we also have the fact
The match is wet then we retract The match lights.
A match lights if struck
A match doesn’t light if struck
The notion of defeasible knowledge covers a diverse variety of information,
including heuristics, rules of conjecture, null values in databases, closed world
assumptions for databases, and some qualitative abstractions of probabilistic
information. Defeasible knowledge is a natural and very common form of in-
formation. There are also obvious advantages to applying the same default a
number of times: There is an economy in stating (and dealing with) only a gen-
eral rule instead of stating (and dealing with) many refined instances of such a
general rule.
Even though argumentation and non-monotonic reasoning are widely ac-
knowledged as closely related phenomena, there is a need to clarify the relation-
ship. There is pioneering work such as by Simari et. al. [SL92,GS04], Prakken
et. al. [Pra93,PS97,Pra10], Bondarenko [BDKT97], and Toni [Ton13,Ton14] that
looks at aspect of this relationship, but it is potentially valuable to revisit the
topic, and in particular investigate it from the point of view of deductive argu-
mentation. So our primary aim in this paper is to investigate how non-monotonic
reasoning arises in deductive argumentation, and how that differs from logics for
non-monotonic reasoning. Our secondary aim is to investigate how logics for
non-monotonic reasoning can be harnessed in deductive argumentation.
We proceed in the rest of the paper as follows: In Section 2, we review deduc-
tive argumentation as an example of a framework for structured argumentation;
In Section 3, we consider how non-monotonic reasoning arises in structured ar-
gumentation; In Section 4, we review default logic, and consider how it can be
harnessed in deductive argumentation; In Section 5, we review conditional logics,
and consider how they can be harnessed in deductive argumentation; In Section
7, we consider how we can model defeasible knowledge as defeasible rules; And
in Section 8, we draw conclusions and consider future work.
2 Deductive argumentation
Deductive argumentation is formalized in terms of deductive arguments and
counterarguments, and there are various choices for defining this [BH08,BH14].
In the rest of this section, we will investigate some of the choices we have for
defining arguments and counterarguments, and for how they can be used in
modelling argumentation.
In order to define a specific system for deductive argumentation, we need
to use a base logic. This is a logic that specifies the logical language for the
knowledge, and the consequence (or entailment) relation for deriving inferences
from the knowledge. In this section, we focus on two choices for base logic.
These are simple logic (which has a language of literals and rules of the form
α1 ∧ . . .∧αn → β where α1, . . . , αn, β are literals, and modus ponens is the only
proof rule) and classical logic (propositional and first-order classical logic).
A deductive argument is an ordered pair 〈Φ, α〉 where Φ ⊢i α holds for
the base logic ⊢i. Φ is the support, or premises, or assumptions of the argument,
and α is the claim, or conclusion, of the argument. Different deductive argumen-
tation systems can be obtained by imposing constraints (such as minimality or
consistency) on the definition of an argument. For an argument A = 〈Φ, α〉, the
function Support(A) returns Φ and the function Claim(A) returns α.
A counterargument is an argument that attacks another argument. In deduc-
tive argumentation, we define the notion of counterargument in terms of logical
contradiction between the claim of the counterargument and the premises or
claim of the attacked argument. We will review some of the kinds of counterar-
gument that can be specified for simple logic and classical logic.
2.1 Simple logic
Simple logic is based on a language of literals and simple rules where each simple
rule is of the form α1 ∧ . . . ∧ αk → β where α1 to αk and β are literals. A
simple logic knowledgebase is a set of literals and a set of simple rules. The
consequence relation is modus ponens (i.e. implication elimination).
Definition 1. The simple consequence relation, denoted ⊢s, which is the
smallest relation satisfying the following condition, and where ∆ is a simple
logic knowledgebase: ∆ ⊢s β iff there is an α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn → β ∈ ∆, and for each
αi ∈ {α1, . . . , αn}, either αi ∈ ∆ or ∆ ⊢s αi.
Example 2. Let ∆ = {a, b, a ∧ b → c, c → d}. Hence, ∆ ⊢s c and ∆ ⊢s d.
However, ∆ 6⊢s a and ∆ 6⊢s b.
Definition 2. Let ∆ be a simple logic knowledgebase. For Φ ⊆ ∆, and a literal
α, 〈Φ, α〉 is a simple argument iff Φ ⊢s α and there is no proper subset Φ
′ of
Φ such that Φ′ ⊢s α.
So each simple argument is minimal but not necessarily consistent (where
consistency for a simple logic knowledgebase ∆ means that for no atom α does
∆ ⊢s α and ∆ ⊢s ¬α hold). We do not impose the consistency constraint in the
definition for simple arguments as simple logic is paraconsistent, and therefore
can support a credulous view on the arguments that can be generated.
Example 3. Let p1, p2, and p3 be the following formulae. Note, we use p1, p2,
and p3 as labels in order to make the presentation of the premises more concise.
Then 〈{p1, p2, p3}, goodEmployee(John)〉 is a simple argument.
p1 = clever(John)
p2 = conscientious(John)
p3 = clever(John)∧ conscientious(John)→ goodEmployee(John)
For simple logic, we consider two forms of counterargument. For this, recall
that literal α is the complement of literal β if and only if α is an atom and β is
¬α or if β is an atom and α is ¬β.
Definition 3. For simple arguments A and B, we consider the following type
of simple attack:
– A is a simple undercut of B if there is a simple rule α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn → β
in Support(B) and there is an αi ∈ {α1, . . . , αn} such that Claim(A) is the
complement of αi.
– A is a simple rebut of B if Claim(A) is the complement of Claim(B).
Example 4. The first argument A1 captures the reasoning that the metro is an
efficient form of transport, so one can use it. The second argument A2 captures
the reasoning that there is a strike on the metro, and so the metro is not an
efficient form of transport (at least on the day of the strike). A2 undercuts A1.
A1 = 〈{efficientMetro, efficientMetro→ useMetro}, useMetro〉
A2 = 〈{strikeMetro, strikeMetro→ ¬efficientMetro},¬efficientMetro〉
Example 5. The first argument A1 captures the reasoning that the government
has a budget deficit, and so the government should cut spending. The second
argument A2 captures the reasoning that the economy is weak, and so the gov-
ernment should not cut spending. The arguments rebut each other.
A1 = 〈{govDeficit, govDeficit→ cutGovSpending}, cutGovSpending〉
A2 = 〈{weakEconomy, weakEconomy→ ¬cutGovSpending},¬cutGovSpending〉
So in simple logic, a rebut attacks the claim of an argument, and an undercut
attacks the premises of the argument (either by attacking one of the literals, or
by attacking the consequent of one of the rules in the premises).
2.2 Classical logic
Classical logic is appealing as the choice of base logic as it better reflects the
richer deductive reasoning often seen in arguments arising in discussions and
debates.
We assume the usual propositional and predicate (first-order) languages for
classical logic, and the usual the classical consequence relation, denoted
⊢. A classical knowledgebase is a set of classical propositional or predicate
formulae.
Definition 4. For a classical knowledgebase Φ, and a classical formula α, 〈Φ, α〉
is a classical argument iff Φ ⊢ α and Φ 6⊢ ⊥ and there is no proper subset Φ′
of Φ such that Φ′ ⊢ α.
So a classical argument satisfies both minimality and consistency. We impose
the consistency constraint because we want to avoid the useless inferences that
come with inconsistency in classical logic (such as via ex falso quodlibet).
Example 6. The following classical argument uses a universally quantified for-
mula in contrapositive reasoning to obtain the claim about number 77.
〈{∀X.multipleOfTen(X)→ even(X),¬even(77)},¬multipleOfTen(77)〉
Given the expressivity of classical logic (in terms of language and inferences),
there are a number of natural ways that we can define counterarguments. We
give some options in the following definition.
Definition 5. Let A and B be two classical arguments. We define the following
types of classical attack.
A is a classical undercut ofB if ∃Ψ ⊆ Support(B) s.t. Claim(A) ≡ ¬
∧
Ψ.
A is a classical direct undercut of B if ∃φ ∈ Support(B) s.t. Claim(A) ≡ ¬φ.
A is a classical rebuttal of B if Claim(A) ≡ ¬Claim(B).
Using simple logic, the definitions for counterarguments against the support
of another argument are limited to attacking just one of the items in the support.
In contrast, using classical logic, a counterargument can be against more than one
item in the support. For example, in Example 7, the undercut is not attacking an
individual premise but rather saying that two of the premises are incompatible
(in this case that the premises lowCost and luxury are incompatible).
Example 7. Consider the following arguments. A1 is attacked by A2 as A2 is an
undercut of A1 though it is not a direct undercut. Essentially, the attack is an
integrity constraint.
A1 = 〈{lowCost, luxury, lowCost∧ luxury→ goodFlight}, goodFlight〉
A2 = 〈{¬lowCost∨ ¬luxury},¬lowCost∨ ¬luxury〉
We give further examples of undercuts in Figure 2.
〈{a, c, a ∧ c→ ¬a},¬a〉 〈{a, c, a ∧ c→ ¬b},¬b〉 〈{b, b→ ¬c},¬c〉
Fig. 1: A generative graph obtained from the simple logic knowlegebase where
∆ = {a, b, c, a ∧ c → ¬a, b → ¬c, a ∧ c → ¬b}. Note, that this exhaustive graph
contains a self cycle, and an odd length cycle.
2.3 Instantiating argument graphs
For a specific deductive argumentation system, once we have a definition for ar-
guments, and for counterarguments (i.e. for the attack relation), we can consider
how to use them to instantiate argument graphs. For this, we need to specify
which arguments and attacks are to appear in the instantiated argument graph.
Two approaches to specifying this are descriptive graphs and generative graphs
defined informally as follows.
– Descriptive graphs Here we assume that the structure of the argument
graph is given, and the task is to identify the premises and claim of each ar-
gument. Therefore the input is an abstract argument graph, and the output
is an instantiated argument graph. This kind of task arises in many situa-
tions: For example, if we are listening to a debate, we hear the arguments
exchanged, and we can construct the instantiated argument graph to reflect
the debate.
– Generative graphs Here we assume that we start with a knowledgebase
(i.e. a set of logical formula), and the task is to generate the arguments and
counterarguments (and hence the attacks between arguments). Therefore,
the input is a knowledgebase, and the output is an instantiated argument
graph. This kind of task also arises in many situations: For example, if we
are making a decision based on conflicting information. We have various
items of information that we represent by formulae in the knowledgebase,
and we construct an instantiated argument graph to reflect the arguments
and counterarguments that follow from that information. Note, we do not
need to include all the arguments and attacks that we can generate from the
knowledgebase. Rather we can define a selection function to choose which
arguments and attacks to include.
We give an example of generative graph in Figure 1 and an example of a
descriptive graph in Figure 2.
For constructing both descriptive graphs and generative graphs, there may
be a dynamic aspect to the process. For instance, when constructing descriptive
graphs, we may be unsure of the exact structure of the argument graph, and it is
only by instantiating individual arguments that we are able to say whether it is
A1 = Patient has
hypertension so
prescribe diuretics
A2 = Patient has
hypertension so pre-
scribe betablockers
A3 = Patient has
emphysema which
is a contraindication
for betablockers
(a) Argument graph.
bp(high)
ok(diuretic)
bp(high) ∧ ok(diuretic) → give(diuretic)
¬ok(diuretic) ∨ ¬ok(betablocker)
give(diuretic) ∧ ¬ok(betablocker)
bp(high)
ok(betablocker)
bp(high) ∧ ok(betablocker) → give(betablocker)
¬ok(diuretic) ∨ ¬ok(betablocker)
give(betablocker) ∧ ¬ok(diuretic)
symptom(emphysema),
symptom(emphysema) → ¬ok(betablocker)
¬ok(betablocker)
(b) Descriptive graph representation of the argument graph.
Fig. 2: The abstract argument graph captures a decision making scenario where
there are two alternatives for treating a patient, diuretics or betablockers. Since
only one treatment should be given for the disorder, each argument attacks the
other. There is also a reason to not give betablockers, as the patient has em-
physema which is a contraindication for this treatment. The descriptive graph
representation of the abstract argument graph is using classical logic. The atom
bp(high) denotes that the patient has high blood pressure. The top two argu-
ments rebut each other (i.e. the attack is classical defeating rebut). For this,
each argument has an integrity constraint in the premises that says that it is
not ok to give both betablocker and diuretic. So the top argument is attacked on
the premise ok(diuretic) and the middle argument is attacked on the premise
ok(betablocker).
Evaluation criteria
Generative graphsDescriptive graphs
Counterarguments
Arguments
Base logic
Knowledgebase
Fig. 3: Framework for constructing argument graphs with deductive arguments:
For defining a specific argumentation system, there are four levels for the spec-
ification: (1) A base logic is required for defining the logical language and the
consequence or entailment relation (i.e. what inferences follow from a set of form-
lulae); (2) A definition of an argument 〈Φ, α〉 specified using the base logic (e.g.
Φ is consistent, and Φ entails α); (3) A definition of counterargument specified
using the base logic (i.e. a definition for when one argument attacks another);
and (4) A definition of which arguments and counterarguments are composed
into an argument graph (which is either a descriptive graph or some form of gen-
erative graph). Then to use a deductive argumentation system, a knowledgebase
needs to be specified in the language of the base logic, and evaluation criteria
such as dialectical semantics need to be selected.
attacked or attacks another argument. As another example, when constructing
generative graphs, we may be involved in a dialogue, and so through the dialogue,
we may obtain further information which allows us to generate further arguments
that can be added to the argument graph.
2.4 Deductive argumentation as a framework
So in order to construct argument graphs with deductive arguments, we need to
specify the the base logic, the definition for arguments, the definition for counter-
arguments, and the definition for instantiating argument graphs. For the latter,
we can either produce a descriptive graph or a generative graph. We summarize
the framework for constructing argument graphs with deductive arguments in
Figure 3.
Key benefits of deductive arguments include: (1) Explicit representation of
the information used to support the claim of the argument; (2) Explicit repre-
sentation of the claim of the argument; and (3) A simple and precise connection
between the support and claim of the argument via the consequence relation.
What a deductive argument does not provide is a specific proof of the claim
from the premises. There may be more than one way of proving the claim from
the premises, but the argument does not specify which is used. It is therefore
indifferent to the proof used.
There are a number of proposals for deductive arguments using classical
propositional logic [Cay95,BH01,AC02,GH11], classical predicate logic [BH05],
description logic [BHP09,MWF10,ZZXL10,ZL13]) temporal logic [MH08], simple
(defeasible) logic [GMAB04,Hun10], conditional logic [BGR13], and probabilistic
logic [Hae98,Hae01,Hun13]. These are monotonic logics, though non-monotonic
logics can be used as a base logics, as we will investigate in this paper.
There has also been progress in understanding the nature of classical logic
in computational argumentation. Types of counterarguments include rebuttals
[Pol87,Pol92], direct undercuts [EGKF93,EGH95,Cay95], and undercuts and
canonical undercuts [BH01]. In most proposals for deductive argumentation, an
argument A is a counterargument to an argument B when the claim of A is in-
consistent with the support of B. It is possible to generalize this with alternative
notions of counterargument. For instance, with some common description logics,
there is not an explicit negation symbol. In the proposal for argumentation with
description logics, [BHP09] used the description logic notion of incoherence to
define the notion of counterargument: A set of formulae in a description logic
is incoherent when there is no set of assertions (i.e. ground literals) that would
be consistent with the formulae. Using this, an argument A is a counterargu-
ment to an argument B when the claim of A together with the support of B is
incoherent.
3 Non-monotonic reasoning
For a logic with a consequence relation ⊢i, an important property is the mono-
tonicity property (below) which states that if α follows from a knowledgebase ∆,
it still follows from ∆ augmented with any additional formula. This is a property
that holds for many logics including classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and many
modal and temporal logics.
∆ ⊢i α
∆ ∪ {β} ⊢i α
[Monotonicity]
In the following example, we assume a consequence relation ⊢i for which
the monotonicity property does not hold, and show how it reflects a form of
defeasible reasoning.
Example 8. Consider the following set of formulae ∆ where ⇒ is some form of
conditional implication symbol.
bird(x)⇒ flyingThing(x)
ostrich(x)⇒ ¬flyingThing(x)
ostrich(x)⇒ bird(x)
Assuming we have an appropriate non-monotonic logic, we would get the fol-
lowing behaviour. So given the rules in ∆ and the premise bird(Tweety) we get
flyingThing(Tweety), but when we add ostrich(Tweety) to the premises, we
no longer get flyingThing(Tweety).
∆ ∪ {bird(Tweety)} ⊢i flyingThing(Tweety)
∆ ∪ {bird(Tweety), ostrich(Tweety)} 6⊢i flyingThing(Tweety)
In the following sections, we will consider specific logics that give us such be-
haviour.
3.1 Non-monotonicity in deductive argumentation
We now focus on deductive argumentation, and investigate the monotonic and
non-monotonic aspects of it.
Argument construction is monotonic In deductive reasoning, we start with
some premises, and we derive a conclusion using one or more inference steps
in a base logic. Within the context of an argument, if we regard the premises
as credible, then we should regard the intermediate conclusion of each infer-
ence step as credible, and therefore we should regard the conclusion as cred-
ible. For example, if we regard the premises “Philippe and Tony are having
tea together in London” as credible, then we should regard that “Philippe
is not in Toulouse” as credible (assuming the background knowledge that
London and Toulouse are different places, and that nobody can be in dif-
ferent places at the same time). As another example, if we regard that the
statement “Philippe and Tony are having an ice cream together in Toulouse”
is credible, then we should regard the statement “Tony is not in London”
as credible. Note, however, we do not need know that the premises are true
to apply deductive reasoning. Rather, deductive reasoning allows us to ob-
tain conclusions that we can regard as credible contingent on the credibility
of their premises. This means that we can form arguments monotonically
from a knowledgebase: Adding formulae to the knowledgebase allows us to
increase the set of arguments.
Argument evaluation is non-monotonic Given a knowledgebase, we use the
base logic to construct the arguments and to identify the attack relationships
that hold between arguments. We then apply the dialectical criteria to deter-
mine which arguments are in an extension according to a specific semantics.
If we then add more formulae to the knowledgebase, we may obtain further
arguments, but we do not lose any arguments. So when we add formulae
to the knowledgebase, we may make additions to the instantiated argument
graph but we do not make any deletions. If we then apply the dialectical
criteria, we may then lose arguments from our extension. So in this sense,
argumentation is non-monotonic.
In the following example, we illustrate how argument construction is mono-
tonic but argument evaluation is non-monotonic.
Example 9. Let ∆ = {a}, and so the following is a generative argument graph
where A′1 stands for all arguments with claim implied by a such as 〈{a}, a ∨ b〉,
〈{a}, a ∨ c〉, etc. Hence, {A1, A
′
1, . . .} is the grounded extension of the graph.
A1 = 〈{a}, a〉 A
′
1 = 〈{a}, . . .〉
If we add ¬a to ∆, we get the following generative argument graph where
A′2 stands for all arguments with claim implied by ¬a such as 〈{¬a},¬a ∨ b〉,
〈{¬a},¬a ∨ c〉, etc. Hence, A1 is no longer in the grounded extension.
A1 = 〈{a}, a〉 A2 = 〈{¬a},¬a〉
A′2 = 〈{¬a}, . . .〉 A
′
1 = 〈{a}, . . .〉
Simple arguments and counterarguments can be used to model defeasible
reasoning. For this, we use simple rules that are normally correct but sometimes
are incorrect. For instance, if Sid has the goal of going to work, Sid takes the
metro. This is generally true, but sometimes Sid works at home, and so it is no
longer true that Sid takes the metro, as we see in the next example.
Example 10. The first argument A1 captures the general rule that if workDay
holds, then useMetro(Sid) holds. The use of the simple rule in A1 requires
that the assumption normal holds. This is given as an assumption. The second
argument A2 undercuts the first argument by contradicting the assumption that
normal holds
A1 = 〈{workDay, normal, workDay∧ normal→ useMetro(Sid)}, useMetro(Sid)〉
A2 = 〈{workAtHome(Sid), workAtHome(Sid)→ ¬normal},¬normal〉
If we start with just argument A1, then A1 is undefeated, and so useMetro(Sid)
is an acceptable claim. However, if we add A2, then A1 is a defeated argument
and A2 is an undefeated argument. Hence, if we have A2, we have to withdraw
useMetro(Sid) as an acceptable claim.
So by having appropriate conditions in the antecedent of a simple rule we
can disable the rule by generating a counterargument that attacks it. This in
effect stops the usage of the simple rule. This means that we have a convention
to attack an argument based on the inferences obtained by the simple logic (e.g.
as in Example 4 and Example 5), or on the rules used (e.g. Example 10).
This way to disable rules by adding appropriate conditions (as in Exam-
ple 10) is analogous to the use of abnormality predicates in formalisms such as
circumscription (see for example [McC80]). We can use the same approach to
capture defeasible reasoning in other logics such as classical logic (as for example,
the use of the ok predicate in the arguments in Figure 2). Note, this does not
mean that we turn the base logic into a nonmonotonic logic. Both simple logic
and classical logic are monotonic logics. Hence, for a simple logic knowledgebase
∆ (and similarly for a classical logic knowledgebase ∆), the set of simple argu-
ments (respectively classical arguments) obtained from ∆ is a subset of the set
of simple arguments (respectively classical arguments) obtained from ∆ ∪ {α}
where α is a formula not in ∆. But at the level of evaluating arguments and
counterarguments, we have non-monotonic defeasible behaviour as illustrated
by Example 10.
In the section, we have focused on using simple logic as a base logic. But it
is very weak since it only has modus ponens as a proof rule. There is a range
of logics between simple logic and classical logic called conditional logics. They
are monotonic, and they capture interesting aspects of defeasible reasoning. We
will briefly consider one type of conditional logic in Section 5.
3.2 Other approaches to structured argumentation
Other approaches to structured argumentation such as ASPIC+ [Pra10,MP14]
and assumption-based argumentation (ABA) [Ton13,Ton14] also have an argu-
ment construction process that is monotonic but an argument evaluation process
that is non-monotonic. These approaches apply rules to the formulae from the
knowledge base, where the rules may be defeasible. These rules are defeasible in
the sense they describe defeasible knowledge but the underlying logic is essen-
tially modus ponens (i.e. analogous to simple logic as investigated for deductive
argumentation) and so monotonic. Note, in these rule-based approaches, an ar-
gument is seen as a tree whose root is the claim or conclusion, whose leaves are
the premises on which the argument is based, and whose structure corresponds
to the application of the rules from the premises to the conclusion.
Through the dialectical semantics of argumentation, it is possible to for-
malize non-monotonic logics. Bondarenko et. al. showed how assumption-based
argumentation subsumes a range of key non-monotonic logics including Theo-
rist, default logic, logic programming, autoepistemic logic, non-monotonic modal
logics, and certain instances of circumscription as special cases [BDKT97]. The
use of assumptions can be introduced to other approaches to structured argu-
mentation (see for example, for ASPIC+ [Pra10]).
In defeasible logic programming (DeLP) [GS04,GS14], another approach to
structured argumentation, strict and defeasible rules are used in a form of logic
programming. The language includes a default negation (i.e. a form of negation-
as-failure) which gives a form of non-monotonic behaviour. Essentially, negation-
as-failure means that if an atom cannot be proved to be true, then assume
it is false. For example, the following is a defeasible rule in DeLP where the
negated atom ∼ crossRailwayTracks is the consequent, −< is the defeasible
implication symbol, and not ∼ trainIsComing is the condition. Furthermore,
∼trainIsComing is a negated atom, and not is the default negation operator.
∼crossRailwayTracks−< not ∼trainIsComing
For the above defeasible rule, if we cannot prove ∼ trainIsComing (i.e. we
cannot show that the train is not coming), then not ∼trainIsComing holds, and
therefore we infer ∼crossRailwayTracks (i.e. we shouldn’t cross the tracks).
In DeLP, the negation-as-failure is with respect to all the strict knowledge
(i.e. the subset of the knowledge that is assumed to be true), rather than just
the premises of the argument, and this means that as formulae are added to
the knowledgebase, it may be necessary to withdraw arguments. For instance,
if there is no strict knowledge, then we can construct an argument that has the
above defeasible rule as the premise, and ∼crossRailwayTracks as the claim.
But, if we then add ∼trainIsComing to the knowledgebase as strict knowledge,
then we have to withdraw this argument. So unlike deductive argumentation,
and the other approaches to structured argumentation, DeLP is not monotonic
in argument contruction. However, like deductive argumentation, and the other
approaches to structured argumentation, DeLP is non-monotonic in argument
evaluation.
4 Default logic
As a basis of representing and reasoning with default knowledge, default logic,
proposed by Reiter [Rei80], is one of the best known and most widely studied
formalisations of default reasoning. Furthermore, it offers a very expressive and
lucid language. In default logic, knowledge is represented as a default theory,
which consists of a set of first-order formulae and a set of default rules for rep-
resenting default information. Default rules are of the following form, where α,
β and γ are classical formulae.
α : β
γ
The inference rules are those of classical logic plus a special mechanism to
deal with default rules: Basically, if α is inferred, and ¬β cannot be inferred,
then infer γ. For this, α is called the pre-condition, β is called the justification,
and γ is called the consequent.
4.1 Inferencing in default logic
Default logic is an extension of classical logic. Hence, all classical inferences
from the classical information in a default theory are derivable (if there is an
extension). The default theory then augments these classical inferences by default
inferences derivable using the default rules.
Definition 6. Let (D,W ) be a default theory, where D is a set of default rules
and W is a set of classical formulae. Let Cn be the function that for a set of
formulae returns the set of classical consequences of those formulae. The operator
Γ indicates what conclusions are to be associated with a given set E of formulae,
where E is some set of classical formulae. For this, Γ (E) is the smallest set of
classical formulae such that the following three conditions are satisfied.
1. W ⊆ Γ (E)
2. Γ (E) = Cn(Γ (E))
3. For each default in D, where α is the pre-condition, β is the justification,
and γ is the consequent, the following holds:
if α ∈ Γ (E), and ¬β 6∈ E, then γ ∈ Γ (E)
We refer to E as the satisfaction set, and Γ (E) the putative extension.
Once Γ (E) has been identified, E is an extension of (D,W ) iff E = Γ (E).
If E is an extension, then the first condition ensures that the set of classical
formulae W is also in the extension, the second condition ensures the extension
is closed under classical consequence, and the third condition ensures that for
each default rule, if the pre-condition is in the extension, and the justification is
consistent with the extension, then the consequent is in the extension.
We can view E as the set of formulae for which we are ensuring consistency
with the justification of each default rule that we are attempting to apply. We
can view Γ (E) as the set of putative conclusions of a default theory: It contains
W , it is closed under classical consequence, and for each default that is applicable
(i.e. the precondition is Γ (E) and the justification is satisfiable with E), then the
consequent is in Γ (E). We ask for the smallest Γ (E) to ensure that each default
rule that is applied is grounded. This means that it is not the case that one or
more default rules are self-supporting. For example, a single default rule is self-
supporting if the pre-condition is satisfied using the consequent. The test E =
Γ (E) ensures that the set of formulae for which the justifications are checked for
consistency coincides with the set of putative conclusions of the default theory. If
E ⊂ Γ (E), then not all applied rules had their justification checked with Γ (E).
If Γ (E) ⊂ E, then the rules are checked with more than is necessary.
Example 11. Let D be the following set of defaults.
bird(X) : ¬penguin(X)∧ fly(X)
fly(X)
penguin(X) : bird(X)
bird(X)
penguin(X) : ¬fly(X)
¬fly(X)
For (D,W ), where W is {bird(Tweety)}, we obtain one extension
Cn({bird(Tweety), fly(Tweety)})
For (D,W ), where W is {penguin(Tweety)}, we obtain one extension
Cn({penguin(Tweety), bird(Tweety),¬fly(Tweety)})
Possible sets of conclusions from a default theory are given in terms of exten-
sions of that theory. A default theory can possess multiple extensions because
different ways of resolving conflicts among default rules lead to different alterna-
tive extensions. For query-answering this implies two options: in the credulous
Attempt E Γ (E) Extension?
1 Cn({bird(Tweety)}) bird(Tweety) E ⊂ Γ (E)
fly(Tweety)
2 Cn({fly(Tweety)}) bird(Tweety) E ⊂ Γ (E)
fly(Tweety)
3 Cn({bird(Tweety), bird(Tweety) E = Γ (E)
fly(Tweety)}) fly(Tweety)
4 Cn({bird(Tweety), bird(Tweety) Γ (E) ⊂ E
¬fly(Tweety)})
5 Cn({¬bird(Tweety), bird(Tweety)} Γ (E) 6⊆ E & E 6⊆ Γ (E)
¬fly(Tweety)})
Fig. 4: A non-exhaustive number of attempts are made for determining an ex-
tension. In each attempt, a guess is made for E, and then Γ (E) is calculated.
approach, we accept a query if it belongs to one of the extensions of a considered
default theory, whereas in the skeptical approach, we accept a query if it belongs
to all extensions of the default theory.
The notion of extension in default logic overlaps with the notion of extension
in argumentation. However, there is a key difference between the two notions. In
the former, the extensions are derived directly from reasoning with the knowl-
edge, whereas in the latter, the extensions are derived from the instantiated
argument graph, and that graph has been generated from the knowledge. As a
consequence, default logic suppresses the inconsistency arising within the rele-
vant knowledge whereas argumentation draws the inconsistency out in the form
of arguments and counterarguments.
4.2 Using default logic in deductive argumentation
We can use default logic as a base logic. Normally, a base logic is monotonic.
However, there is no reason to not use a non-monotonic logic such as default
logic. Let ⊢d be the consequence relation for default logic. For a default theory
∆ = (D,W ), and a propositional formula α, ∆ ⊢d α denotes that α is in a
default logic extension of (D,W ). So the consequence relation is credulous. We
could use a skeptical version as an alternative.
Definition 7. For a default theory Φ = (D,W ), and a classical formula α,
〈Φ, α〉 is a default argument iff Φ ⊢d α and there is no proper subset Φ
′ of Φ
such that Φ′ ⊢d α.
For the above definition, Φ′ = (D′,W ′) is a proper subset of Φ = (D,W ) iff
D′ ⊆ D and W ′ ⊂W or D′ ⊂ D and W ′ ⊆W .
We now consider a definition for attack where the counterargument attacks
an argument when it negates the justification of a default rule in the premises
bird(Tweety)(
bird(X):¬penguin(X)∧fly(X)
fly(X)
)
fly(Tweety)
penguin(Tweety)
penguin(Tweety)
penguin(Tweety)(
penguin(X):¬fly(X)
¬fly(X)
)
¬fly(Tweety)
Fig. 5: Example of using default logic as a base logic in deductive argumentation.
Here the top argument and the right arguments are default arguments, whereas
the left argument is a classical argument. Each argument is presented with the
premises above the line, and the claim below the line. Each default rule is given
in brackets.
of the argument. For this we require a function DefaultRules(A) to return the
default rules used in the premises of an default argument.
Definition 8. For arguments A and B, where A is a default argument, and B is
either a default argument or a classical argument, B justification undercuts
A if there is α : β/γ ∈ DefaultRules(A) s.t. Claim(B) ⊢ ¬β.
We illustrate justification undercuts in Figure 5. In the figure, the left un-
dercut involves a classical argument, and the right undercut involves a default
argument.
Using default logic as a base logic in this way does not affect the argument
contruction being monotonic. Adding a formula to the knowledgebase would not
cause an argument to be withdrawn. Rather it may allow further arguments to
be constructed.
The advantage of using default logic in arguments is that it allows default
inferences to be drawn. This means that we use a well-developed and well-
understand formalism for representing and reasoning with the complexities of
default knowledge. Hence, we can have a richer and more natural representation
of defaults. It also means that inferences can be drawn in the absence of reasons
to not draw them. For instance, in Figure 5, we can conclude fly(Tweety) from
bird(Tweety) in the absence of knowing whether it is a penguin. In other words,
we just need to know that it is consistent to believe that it is not a penguin and
that it is consistent to believe that it can fly. Furthermore, we just need to do this
consistency check within the premises of the argument. Note, this consistency
check is different to the consistency check used for default negation in DeLP
which involves checking consistency with all the strict knowledge (i.e. the subset
of knowledge that is assumed to be correct) [GS04].
In this paper, we have only given an indication of how default logic can be
used to capture aspects of non-monotonic reasoning (for a comprehensive review
of default logic, see [Bes89]) in deductive argumentation. There are various ways
(e.g. by Santos and Pav˜ao Martins [SM08]) that default logic could be harnessed
in deductive argumentation to give richer behaviour . Also possible definitions for
counterarguments could be adapted from an approach to argumentation based
on default logic by Prakken [Pra93].
5 KLM logics for non-monotonic reasoning
The KLM logics for non-monotonic reasoning are a family of conditional logics
developed by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [KLM90] to capture aspects of non-
monotonic reasoning and where each logic has a proof theory and a possible
worlds semantics. We focus here on a member of this family called System P
which has the language composed of formulae of the form α⇒ β where α, β are
propositional formulae, and it has the the following set of proof rules.
(REF )
A⇒ A
(CUT )
A⇒ B A ∧B ⇒ C
A⇒ C
(LLE)
A ≡ B A⇒ C
B ⇒ C
(RW )
⊢ A→ B C ⇒ A
C ⇒ B
(AND)
A⇒ B A⇒ C
A⇒ B ∧ C
(OR)
A⇒ C B ⇒ C
A ∨B ⇒ C
(CM)
A⇒ B A⇒ C
A ∧B ⇒ C
(LOOP )
A0 ⇒ A1 A1 ⇒ A2 . . . Ak−1 ⇒ Ak Ak ⇒ A0
A0 ⇒ Ak
We illustrate this proof systems using the following examples of inferences.
In the examples, we can see how the reasoning is monotonic in that no infer-
ences (i.e. no formula of the form α ⇒ β) are retracted. However, within these
formulae, the defeasible reasoning is encoded. For instance, in Example 12, we
have a formula that says “birds fly”, and we have the inference that says “birds
that are penguins do not fly”.
Example 12. From the following statements
penguin⇒ bird penguin⇒ ¬fly bird⇒ fly
we get the following inferences
penguin∧ bird⇒ ¬fly fly⇒ ¬penguin
bird⇒ ¬penguin bird∨ penguin⇒ fly
bird ∨ penguin⇒ ¬penguin
We can use System P as a base logic in a deductive argumentation system.
We start by giving the following definition of an argument.
Definition 9. Conditional logic argument For a set of conditional statements
Φ and a set of propositional formulae Ψ , if Φ ⊢P α ⇒ β and ∧Ψ ≡ α, then a
preferential argument is 〈Φ ∪ Ψ, α⇒ β〉.
Example 13. For premises Φ = {penguin ⇒ bird, penguin ⇒ ¬fly} and Ψ =
{penguin, bird}, the following is a preferential argument.
〈Φ ∪ Ψ, penguin∧ bird⇒ ¬fly〉
Next, we can define a range of attack relations. The following definition is
not exhaustive as there are further options that we could consider.
Definition 10. Some preferential attack relations: Let A1 = 〈Φ∪Ψ, α ⇒ β〉 and
A2 = 〈Φ
′ ∪ Ψ ′, γ ⇒ δ〉.
– A2 is a rebuttal of A1 iff δ ⊢ ¬β and γ ⊢ α
– A2 is a direct rebuttal of A1 iff δ ≡ ¬β and γ ⊢ α
– A2 is a undercut of A1 iff δ ⊢ ¬α
– A2 is a canonical undercut of A1 iff δ ≡ ¬α
– A2 is a direct undercut of A1 iff there is σ ∈ Ψ such that δ ≡ ¬σ
Example 14. For A1 and A2 below, A2 is a direct rebuttal of A1, but not vice
versa,
– A1 = 〈Φ1 ∪ Ψ1, bird⇒ fly〉
– A2 = 〈Φ2 ∪ Ψ2, penguin∧ bird⇒ ¬fly〉
where
– Φ1 = {bird⇒ fly},
– Ψ1 = {bird},
– Φ2 = {penguin⇒ bird, penguin⇒ ¬fly},
– Ψ2 = {penguin, bird}.
Example 15. For A1 and A2 below, A2 is a direct rebuttal of A1, but not vice
versa,
– A1 = 〈Φ1 ∪ Ψ1, matchIsStruck⇒ matchLights〉
– A2 = 〈Φ2 ∪ Ψ2, matchIsStruck∧ matchIsWet⇒ ¬matchLights〉
Harnessing System P, and the other members of the KLM family, offers the
ability to undertake intuitive reasoning with defeasible rules. This allows for
plausible consequences from knowledge to be investigated. It also allows for more
efficient representation of knowledge to be undertaken since fewer rules would
be required when compared with using simple logic. Furthermore, this reasoning
can be implemented using automated reasoning [GGOP09].
6 Further conditional logics
Conditional logics are a valuable alternative to classical logic for knowledge rep-
resentation and reasoning. Whilst many conditional logics extend classical logic,
the implication introduced is normally more restricted than the strict implication
used in classical logic. This means that many knowledge modelling situations,
such as for non-monotonic reasoning, can be better captured by conditional log-
ics (such as [Del87,KLM90,ACS92]).
By using conditional logic as a base logic, we have a range of options for more
effective modelling complex real-world scenarios. For instance, they can be used
to capture hypothetical statements of the form “If α were true, then β would be
true”. This done by introducing an extra connective⇒ to extend a classical logic
language. Informally, α⇒ β is valid when β is true in the possible worlds where
α is true. Representing and reasoning with such knowledge in argumentation is
valuable because useful arguments exist that refer to fictitious and hypothetical
situations as shown by Besnard et. al. [BGR13].
So we are proposing that we should move beyond simple logic (i.e. modus
ponens) that is essentially the logic used for most structured argumentation
systems. Even though formalisms such as ASPIC+ and ABA are general frame-
works that accept a wide range of proof systems, most exmaples of using the
frameworks involve simple rule-based systems (i.e. rules with modus ponens).
Once we accept that we can move beyond simple rule-based systems, we have
a wide range of formalisms that we could consider, in particular conditional log-
ics. This then raises the question of what proof theory do we want for reasoning
with the defeasible rules. Central to such considerations is whether we want to
have contrapositive reasoning.
In considering this issue for argumentation, Caminada recalls two simple
examples where the inference of contrapositives is problematic [Cam08].
– Men usually do not have beards. But, this does not imply that if someone
does have a beard, then that person is not a man.
– If I buy a lottery ticket, then I will normally not win a prize. But, this does
not imply that if I do win a prize, then I did not buy a ticket.
To identify situation where contrapositive reasoning is potentially desirable,
Caminada described the following two types of situation.
Epistemic Defeasible rules describe how certain facts hold in relation to each
other in the world. So the world exists independently of the rules. Here,
contrapositive reasoning may be appropriate.
Constitutive Defeasible rules (in part) describe how the world is constructed
(e.g. regulations). So the world does not exist independently of the rules.
Here contrapositive reasoning is not appropriate.
The first example below illustrates the first kind of situation, and the second
example illustrates the second kind of situation. Note that the knowledge in each
example is syntactically identical.
Example 16. The following rules describe an epistemic situation. From these
rules, it would be reasonable to infer ¬A from L.
– O⇒ A - goods ordered three months ago will probably have arrived now.
– A⇒ C - arrived goods will probably have a customs document.
– L⇒ ¬C - goods listed as unfulfilled will probably lack customs document.
Example 17. The following rules describe a constitutive situation. From these
rules, it would not be reasonable to infer ¬M from P.
– S⇒ M - snoring in the library is form of misbehaviour.
– M⇒ R - misbehaviour in the library can result in removal from the library.
– P⇒ ¬R - professors cannot be removed from the library.
A wide variety of conditional logics have been proposed to capture various
aspects of conditionality including deontics, counterfactuals, relevance, and prob-
ability [Che75]. These give a range of proof theories and semantics for capturing
different aspects of reasoning with conditions, and many of these do not support
contrapositive reasoning.
7 Modelling defeasible knowledge
Another important aspect of non-monotonic reasoning is how we model defea-
sible knowledge in a meaningful way. A defeasible or default rule is a rule that
is generally true but has exceptions and so is sometimes untrue. But this expla-
nation still leaves some latitude as to what we really mean by a defeasible rule.
To illustrate this issue, consider the following rule.
birds fly (∗)
If we take all the normal situations (or observations, or worlds or days), and in
the majority of these birds fly, then (*) may be equal to the following
birds normally fly
Or if we take the set of all birds (or all the birds you have seen, or read about,
or watched on TV) and the majority of this set fly, then (*) may be equal to
the following
most birds fly
Or perhaps if we take the set of all birds, we know the majority have the ca-
pability to fly, then (*) could equate with the following. — though this in turn
raises the question of what it is to know something has a capability
most birds have the capability to fly
Or if we take an idealized notion of a bird that we in a society are happy to
agree upon, then we could equate (*) with the following
a prototypical bird flies
As another illustration of this issue, consider the following rule which is in
the vein as the “birds fly” example but introduces further complications.
birds lay eggs (∗∗)
We may take (**) as meaning the following — but on a given day, (or given
situation, or observation) a given bird bird will probably not lay an egg.
birds normally lay eggs
Or we could say (**) means the following — but half the bird population is male
and therefore don’t lay eggs.
most birds have the capability lay eggs
Or perhaps we could say (**) means the following — where
most species of bird reproduce by laying eggs
However, the above involves a lot of missing information to be filled in, and in
general it is challenging to know how to formalize a defeasible rule.
Obviously different applications call for different ways to interpret defeasible
rules. Specifying the underlying ontology by recourse to description logic may
be useful, and in some situations formalization in a probabilistic logic (see for
example, [Bac90]) may be appropriate
8 Conclusions
Discrimination between the monotonic and non-monotonic aspects of a deductive
argumentation system is important to better understand the nature of deductive
argumentation. Each deductive argumentation system is based on a base logic
which can be monotonic or non-monotonic. In either case, the construction of ar-
guments and counterarguments is monotonic in the sense that adding knowledge
to the knowledgebase may increase the set of arguments and counterargument
but it cannot reduce the set of arguments or counterarguments. However, at the
evaluation level, deductive argumentation is non-monotonic since adding argu-
ments and counterarguments to the instantiated graph may cause arguments to
be withdrawn from an extension, or even for extensions to be withdrawn.
Defeasible formulae (such as defeasible rules) are an important kind of knowl-
edge in argumentation, as in non-monotonic reasoning. They are formulae that
are often correct, but sometimes can be incorrect. Depending on what aspect
of defeasible knowledge we want to model, there is a wide variety of base logics
that we can use to represent and reason with it. This range includes simple logic
and classical logic when we use appropriate conventions such abnormality predi-
cates, in which case, we can overturn an argument based defeasible knowledge by
recourse counterarguments that attack the assumption of normality. This range
of base logics also includes default logic and conditional logics.
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